The MANRS Observatory monitors Internet routing security by aggregating data from trusted sources into a user-friendly dashboard to help network operators improve the security of their networks.
We are launching a free online tool today to help network operators and researchers see the state of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) around the world.
This week is RPKI Week! To boost adoption of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) during the event, we are running a contest to encourage network operators to add Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to their networks.
By Peter Peele, Computer Engineer, who has given us permission to repost this post from his blog.
By Steven Wallace, Internet2 Security Architect and MANRS Ambassador (2021 cohort) This article is adapted from the original version that appeared on Internet2, which has kindly let us republish it.
Received a Saturday morning ping on Twitter from Doug Madory, Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik, highlighting a major Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack event overnight. My weekend is sorted, but let’s dig into this incident and learn from the lesson.
By Dr. Bahaa Al-Musawi, MANRS Fellow (2020 cohort) Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), as defined in RFC 6810, was proposed to authenticate the relationship between a prefix and its origination. While it has many advantages, such as reducing route leaks, the system introduces some security issues.
By Augusto Mathurin, MANRS Fellow (2020 Cohort) While the MANRS team has already covered Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security and the MANRS Year in Review for 2020, we can analyze BGP incidents gathered from different sources and through different lenses.
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and cloud providers exchange trafﬁc with thousands of other networks so data can ﬂow efﬁciently around the world, and their participation in MANRS ampliﬁes the positive effect they have on routing security and the routing hygiene of networks they pee