Action 1: Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
SIACOM's BGP network does perform ingress and egress filtering of RFC1918 nets, SIACOM accepts correctly described in RIPEDB customer ASN's originated prefixes no longer then /24 (for IPv4), SIACOM recommends all Customers to use only RPKI signed BGP announcements.
SIACOM does announce all correct prefixes, which present in AS198150:AS-SIACOM subset of members, to Peers and Uplinks.
Action 2: Prevent traffic with spoofed source IP addresses
SIACOM uses uRPF and access-lists (firewall) protection to mitigate risks of any spoofed traffic from own infrastructure and from single-homed stub end-users' client networks following BCP38/RFC2827. SIACOM also uses access-lists (firewall) protection to mitigate risks of any spoofed traffic from ISP-customers. SIACOM does not use uRPF on BGP transit sessions with ISP-customers.
Action 3: Facilitate global operational communication and coordination
SIACOM is always happy to communicate with all network operators, and has 24 hours NOC. See https://www.peeringdb.com/net/33415
Action 4: Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale
SIACOM is taking care of maintaining the full set of Customers' cone in RIPE DB's as-set object AS198150:AS-SIACOM in timely manner. Up-to-date routing policy is published in AS198150 object in RIPE DB. All prefixes being originated have appropriate Route objects in RIPE DB as well.
SIACOM strongly encourages every network operator to follow the MANRS principles while running parts-of-the-Global-Internet networks.