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Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security

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RPKI

March 29, 2022

March 29, 2022

Lesson Learned: Twitter Shored Up Its Routing Security

With so many eyes on networks and traffic flows around Ukraine and Russia, any misleading announcement is quickly investigated. That’s what happened yesterday, when AS8342 (RTComm) started announcing 104.244.42.0/24, a prefix assigned to Twitter Inc

Read More » about Lesson Learned: Twitter Shored Up Its Routing Security

Category iconRouting Security,  Routing Security Incidents Tag iconbgp hijack,  RPKI

March 4, 2022

Did Ukraine suffer a BGP hijack and how can networks protect themselves?

On 15 February 2022, several high-level Ukrainian services including the Ministry of Defence and two large national banks were targeted with DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks. Financial services were disrupted for several hours.

Read More » about Did Ukraine suffer a BGP hijack and how can networks protect themselves?

Category iconNews and Announcements,  Routing Security,  Routing Security Incidents Tag iconBGP,  bgp hijack,  RPKI

November 12, 2021

The Routing Game: Hunting Invalid Routes

By Romain Fontugne, MANRS Fellow and Senior Researcher at Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ) Research Lab In the past few years we have seen a substantial increase in the number of registered Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects.

Read More » about The Routing Game: Hunting Invalid Routes

Category iconAmbassador & Fellowship,  Routing Security Tag iconROA,  ROV,  RPKI

November 2, 2021

MANRS Task Force Develops New Guidelines for Managing ROAs

By Somesh Chaturmohta and Ali Monfared, Microsoft Networking Today, we are happy to see the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) community coming together to propose a set of recommendations for the management of cryptographic objects that are at the heart of Resource Public […]

Read More » about MANRS Task Force Develops New Guidelines for Managing ROAs

Category iconMANRS Participants,  MANRS Publications,  News and Announcements Tag iconROA,  RPKI

July 13, 2021

Feedback Requested: Avoiding Commons Pitfalls in Managing ROAs

A MANRS task force has developed a set of recommendations to help increase the resilience and security of Route Origin Authorization (ROA). We would love to have your feedback.

Read More » about Feedback Requested: Avoiding Commons Pitfalls in Managing ROAs

Category iconNews and Announcements,  Routing Security,  Tutorials Tag iconRPKI

July 12, 2021

RPKI Week Opens with ROA Contest

This week is RPKI Week! To boost adoption of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) during the event, we are running a contest to encourage network operators to add Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to their networks.

Read More » about RPKI Week Opens with ROA Contest

Category iconNews and Announcements,  Routing Security Tag iconMANRS,  RPKI

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